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The United States Supreme Court
in Godinez v. Moran, 113 S.Ct. 2680
(1993), held that the standard ofmen-
tal functioning required before a crimi-
nal defendant may plead guilty or
voluntarily waive his right to the as-
sistance of counsel is the same stan-
dard of competency required for stand-
ing trial. In so holding, Justice Tho-
mas, writing for the majority, found
that the Due Process Clause did not
require a heightened competency stan-
dard for pleading guilty or waiving
the right to counsel.
On August 13, 1984, in his hospi-
tal bed, Richard Allen Moran con-
fessed to killing the bartender of the
Red Pearl Saloon in Carson City,
Nevada, and a patron of that estab-
lishment on August 2, 1984. He
further admitted that he murdered his
ex-wife nine days later. Following the
shooting of his ex-wife, Moran at-
tempted suicide by shooting himself
in the abdomen and slitting his wrists.
At arraignment, Moran entered a
plea of not guilty to three counts of
first-degree murder. Subsequently, the
trial court ordered apsychiatric evalu-
ation in order to ascertain his compe-
tence to stand trial. In September
1984, two psychiatrists found that
Moran was competent to stand trial.
The prosecution then issued notice of
its intent to seek the death penalty. On
November 28, 1984, Moran informed
the trial court ofhis des ire to waive hi s
constitutional right to the assistance
of counsel and to enter guilty pleas to
the three murder counts in order to
prevent the admission of mitigating
evidence at sentencing. Thereupon,
the trial court inquired into Moran's
mental competence to waive his rights
and found that Moran '"knowingly
and intelligently' waive[d] his right to
the assistance of counsel.. and that
his guilty pleas were 'freely and vol-
untarily' given...." Godinez, 113 S.Ct.
at 2683 (citations omitted).
A three judge panel sentenced
Moran to death for each of the three
counts of first-degree murder on Janu-
ary 21, 1985. On appeal, the Su-
preme Court of Nevada upheld both
death sentences for the Red Pearl
Saloon murders, but reversed the sen-
tence for the murder of Moran's ex-
wife in favor ofa life sentence without
parole.
Thereafter, Moran sought post-
conviction reliefinNevada state court
on the theory that he was incompetent
to serve as his own counsel. At an
evidentiary hearing, the trial court
rejected Moran's claim on the basis
that two psychiatrists had evaluated
him as competent and Nevada's high-
est court dismissedhis appeal. Moran
then filed a writ of habeas corpus in
the United States District Court for
the District of Nevada, which denied
his petition.
Subsequently, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit reversed
and concluded that the Nevada state
trial court erred at the post-conviction
evidentiary hearing when it applied
the competency standard for standing
trial, rather thanthe "reasoned choice"
standard. The court of appeals ruled
that constitutional waiver required a
heightened standard of competency
because waiving counsel or pleading
guilty requires a "capacity for 'rea-
soned choice' among the alternatives
available to him." Id. at 2684 (cita-
tions omitted). The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari in
order to resolve the conflict among the
federal courts of appeals and the state
supreme courts as to what standard of
competency due process requires when
evaluating a criminal defendant's en-
try of a guilty plea or waiver of his
right to counsel.
The Court began its analysis by
enumerating a two-prong test for
mental competence to stand trial--the
threshold issue which must be re-
solved before a criminal defendant
may be tried. The first element re-
quired a criminal defendant to have
"'sufficient present ability to consult
with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding."'
Id. at 2685 (quoting Dusky v. United
States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960)). The
second element required the defen-
dant to have "a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceed-
ings against him." Id. (quoting Dusky,
362 U.S. 402 (1960)).
The Court next rejected the posi-
tion of the court of appeals that due
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process requires a heightened level of
mental functioning before a criminal
defendant may plead guilty or waive
his right to counsel. The Court did not
distinguish between the "reasoned
choice" standard of competence ap-
plied by the court of appeals and the
"rational understanding of the pro-
ceedings" test applied when evaluat-
ing competency to stand trial. The
Court observed that a criminal defen-
dant will have to consider the same
rights when deciding either to stand
trial or plead guilty. The Court recog-
nized that "while the decision to plead
guilty is undeniably a profound one, it
is no more complicated than the sum
total of decisions that a defendant
may be called upon to make during the
course of a trial." Id. at 2686. Such
decisions may include whether to take
the witness stand, waive his right to a
jury trial, or waive his right to con-
front his accusers by foregoing any
cross-examination of the state's wit-
ness. Id.
Moreover, the Court opined that a
criminal defendant's waiver of his
constitutional right to the assistance
of counsel does not require the exer-
cise of"an appreciably higher level of
mental functioning than the decision
to waive other constitutional rights."
Id. The Court emphasized that a
defendant need only make a compe-
tent waiver, regardless of whether or
not he is competent to represent him-
self. Although the accused may be
incapable of representing himself ef-
fectively due to his lack of legal knowl-
edge and experience, the Court
stressed the necessity of honoring a
defendant's right to choose self-rep-
resentation. Id. at 2687.
The Court continued its analysis
by clarifying the two-prong waiver
test contemplated in Westbrook v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 150(1966). First,
the court must determine that a defen-
dant is competent to stand trial. Sec-
ond, once a defendant decides to plead
guilty or waive his right to counsel,
the trial court must make a finding
that the defendant made a knowing
and voluntary relinquishment of his
constitutional rights. Id. (citations
omitted). The Court noted, however,
that a trial court need not make a
separate competency determination in
every case, but only in those where the
defendant's competency to stand trial
is in doubt. Id. at 2688, n.13.
The Court concluded by stating
that the purpose of the competency
requirement is to safeguard that a
criminal defendant understands the
nature of the proceedings initiated
against him and that he is capable of
assisting counsel in his defense. The
Court also stressed that the level of
mental functioning needed to assist
counsel during trial, such as whether
a defendant should take the witness
stand and thereby waive his right
against self-incrimination, is the same
level of mental functioning required
to reasonably waive other constitu-
tional rights.
In his concurring opinion, Justice
Kennedy, with whom Justice Scalia
joined, agreed in the result, but noted
his reservations about the majority's
reasoning. Justice Kennedy found
that the majority's emphasis upon the
types of decisions a defendant must
make throughout the course of a trial
was misplaced. The concurring opin-
ion stated that such reasoning tends to
"confuse the content of the standard
with the occasions for its applica-
tion." Id. at 2688 (Kennedy, J., con-
curring). Through an historical analy-
sis of the common law, Justice
Kennedy determined that a single com-
petency standard applied for the dura-
tion of a trial to all of the various
decisions a defendant may make
throughout the pendency of his case.
Justice Kennedy then concluded that
a single standard of competency did
not offend the requirements of the
Due Process Clause. Id. at 2691.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice
Blackmun, with whom Justice Stevens
joined, rejected the majority's analy-
sis as "contrary to both common sense
and longstanding case law." 1d. at
2692 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Blackmun further admonished the
majority for diminishing the signifi-
cance of key facts and circumstances
of the Moran case. The Court mini-
mized the importance of his suicide
attempt and use of four different pre-
scription drugs at the time he plead
guilty to capital murder and waived
his right to counsel, by relegating
them to footnotes. Justice Blackmun
further argued that based on the facts
of the Moran case, the trial court
should have conducted another com-
petency determination to establish if
Moran was capable of waiving his
constitutional rights. The dissent con-
sidered the competency standards for
standing trial and waiving counsel as
inherently different, thereby conclud-
ing that the standard of competency
required to waive the right to counsel
was similar to the Ninth Circuit's
"reasoned choice" standard. Id. at
2695.
The Godinez decision is signifi-
cant in that the Supreme Court has
resolved the confusion surrounding
the competency standard required
when a defendant waives his right to
counsel or enters a plea of guilty.
According to the Court, the Due Pro-
cess Clause requires only a finding of
competency to stand trial. This stan-
dard is the level of mental functioning
needed to reasonably make any deci-
sion throughout the course of a trial,
as long as a defendant has been ren-
dered competent to assist counsel in
his defense. This simplifies the in-
quiry in criminal cases where compe-
tency to stand trial is not in doubt; in
those cases the trial court need only
determine whether the defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived
his constitutional rights.
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